From Duration to Simultaneity: Henri Bergson’s Time Theory #
The article explores Bergson’s philosophical reflection on time. Bergson’s duration-based view of time is an intrinsically transcendental view of time, and a rejection of clock time; its transcendence is reflected in the conceptual nature of time consciousness on the one hand, and in the account of the “simultaneity of duration” on the other. Bergson’s theory of duration in Time and Free Will distinguishes between spatialized time and pure duration, and argues that the latter cannot be descripted through language or science, and is therefore susceptible to the problem of dichotomy between private consciousness and publicness. To solve this problem from within the doctrine of time, one needs to rely on simultaneity. Bergson’s account of simultaneity is, on the one hand, an extension of the duration theory, and on the other hand, it can be considered as a so-called “implicit premise” of duration as a way to reach the universal world beyond private consciousness of internal time. The difference in psychoanalytical and phenomenological attitude toward Bergson’s theory of time probably stems from the difference in understanding the issue of simultaneity, i.e., whether the stream of consciousness can transcend multiple consciousnesses or grasp the subconscious content in the same conscious process.